MOROCCO /6 June 2007

 

 

 

OVERVIEW

 

In the first Islamic terror attack in Morocco in four years, two brothers blew themselves up just outside the US Consulate in Casablanca 14 April, causing minor damage and wounding only one person, a local woman who was passing by.  The timing of the attack on a Saturday morning and the crude tactics made plain that the assailants were not hard-core terrorists.

 

Authorities said the brothers were not linked to a more organized group of young Islamic militants broken up in Casablanca weeks earlier.  The leader of that cell and a comrade were viewing Islamic militant web sites in an Internet cafe on 11 March when the proprietor tried to call the police.  During the ensuing scuffle, the cell leader detonated the explosives vest he was wearing, killing himself and wounding four others, including his comrade.  On 10 April, police cornered four other members of the cell.  One was shot dead as he tried to detonate an explosives vest he was wearing.  Another blew himself up seconds later, harming no one.  The other two blew themselves up nearby, killing one policeman and wounding several others. 

 

Islamic terrorism had not reared its head in Morocco since 16 May 2003, when a string of suicide-bombings in Casablanca killed 45 people, including 12 assailants.  Those attacks were a case study in poor planning and execution.  But they were a wake-up call to authorities, who subsequently have arrested 3,000 suspected militants organized into over 50 cells.  Most consisted of slum dwellers.  But Ansar el-Mahdi (Supporters of the Deliverer – AM), a group broken up in August, was decidedly middle-class and included soldiers and policemen.

 

The biggest concern is that hard-core Moroccan Islamic terrorists based in Western Europe, Iraq and Pakistan will turn their attention to their motherland.  Indeed, local police on 8 March arrested a senior operative of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (French abbr: GICM), a loose network of militants across the Strait of Gibraltar that was involved in the 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191 people.  Adding to the peril, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (French abbr: GSPC), an Algerian insurgent group that in recent years has aligned itself with Usama bin Ladin, in January renamed itself the al-Qaida Organization for the Islamic Maghreb (QIM) with the aim of creating a common front across North Africa.

 

Morocco may be visited on important business, but personnel should minimize their circulation, varying patterns and being alert for surveillances when they do move about.  Western hangouts, tourist attractions, Jewish sites, slums and university campuses should be avoided altogether.  Demonstrations also should be avoided, and mosques should be given wide berth, especially after Friday prayers.  Multinationals should keep access controls up to spec.  No business-class hotel is immune to suicide car-bombing.  The least bad option in central Casablanca is the Hyatt, while in central Rabat the Le Tour Hassan is the least bad.  At any hotel, rooms should be booked facing away from any road or parking lot and as far from the lobby as possible.  Petty-crime rates are high, mandating serious precautions.

 

Meanwhile, King Mohammed VI faces a dilemma with 7 September parliamentary elections looming.  An enthusiastic modernizer, he must decide whether to allow a fair vote, which polls show the Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party (French abbr: PJD) would win.

 

INSIGHTS:  TERRORISM

 

As terrorist attacks go, the suicide-bombings outside the US Consulate in Casablanca were odd.  The assailants, Omar and Mohammed Maha, struck at 0845 on a Saturday, when the facility was closed.  They seemed to have no plan for breaching the outer walls.

 

One brother blew himself up six yards from the consulate, killing himself and injuring a woman who happened to be passing by.  Surveillance video shows him backing away from a local security guard, suggesting that he either lost his nerve or did not want to kill anyone but himself.

 

About 20 seconds later the other brother dispatched himself about 60 yards from the consulate, near the American Cultural Center.  He harmed no one but himself.

 

Authorities suggested that the brothers acted largely on their own, with one who had fallen under the spell of radical Islam convincing the other to go along.  Searches of places the brothers frequented turned up Islamic extremist materials, as well as a will in which they decried global injustice against Muslims and asserted that they were following a “divine order” to stage suicide-bombings.

 

It is conceivable that the brothers decided on their own to stage the attack.  But the radical one was known to authorities, making clear that he had links of some kind to organized militants.  And the brothers may have had help in assembling their primitive yet relatively powerful bombs, which mainly consisted of acetone and cleaning supplies.

 

Lame though they were, the suicide-bombings near the consulate were the first terrorist attack in the country in four years.  Also, the fact that the blasts occurred in an elite area was disturbing.

 

At the time, the consulate attack was all the more alarming because police had announced that they were hunting for some 10 would-be suicide-bombers belonging to a cell that had surfaced in Casablanca a month earlier.  Members of the cell were said to be wearing explosives belts at all times to blow themselves up if confronted.

 

The cell came to light by accident.  Its leader Abdelfettah Raydi and a comrade were viewing Islamic militant web sites in an Internet cafe in the slum of Sidi Moumen when the proprietor closed the door and attempted to phone the police.  A scuffle ensued in which Raydi detonated the explosives he was wearing, killing himself and wounding four others.  One of those hurt was Raydi’s comrade, who managed to run two miles before being caught by police.  It turned out that he too was wearing an explosives belt.

 

In ensuing days and weeks, 31 suspected members of the cell were arrested.  Officials said the group was planning to strike foreign ships docked in Casablanca as well as police stations, hotels and tourist sites in Marrakech, Agadir and other cities.  It did not appear that attacks were imminent at the time of the Internet cafe incident, however.

 

The manhunt was intense.  At about 0500 on 10 April, police surrounded a safehouse in the Hay Farah slum where at least four members of the cell were holed up.  They shot dead one suspect, reportedly as he attempted to detonate the explosives attached to his body.  Another militant immediately thereafter blew himself up on a balcony of the house, apparently upon concluding that there was no escape.

 

A short time later, a third militant blew himself up in the same area, killing a police inspector.  That turned out to be the one fatality inflicted during the spate of suicide blasts in March and April.

 

Hours after that, a fourth militant who had been in the safehouse blew himself up on a main street in Hay Farah, killing himself and wounding two policemen and three civilians.

 

Like the Maha brothers, members of the Raydi cell used explosives made from readily available commercial products.  That indicated that the cell was operating with limited resources.

 

Authorities suggested that the Raydi cell was a remnant of the unsophisticated cell that staged the 16 March 2003 bombings.  What is beyond dispute is that members of both cells mostly came from Sidi Moumen.  In fact, Raydi and some of his comrades were among numerous Islamic extremists from the slum jailed in the wake of the 2003 attacks.

 

Moroccan authorities are tight-lipped when it comes to security matters.  But the 2003 attacks came into somewhat clearer focus on 22 December, when ringleaders Youssef Addad and Abdelmalek Bouizakare were sentenced to death.  Thirteen other defendants received prison sentences ranging from five to 30 years. 

 

Addad was said to be the head of an Islamic extremist group called As-Sirat Almoustakia (The Straight Path) that encouraged poorly educated young men from Sidi Moumen to blow themselves up.  In all, 14 suicide-bombers targeted the Kuwaiti-owned, five-star Farah Hotel, a Spanish restaurant, a Jewish-owned Italian restaurant, a Jewish cemetery and a Jewish cultural center. 

 

Twenty people were killed at the Spanish restaurant, including several French, Spanish and Italian citizens.  The other assailants botched their missions.

 

At the hotel, one bomber blew himself up, killing a security guard and a porter in addition to himself.  But his partner proved unable or unwilling to carry out a follow-up blast, and was arrested. 

 

The two assailants tasked with attacking the Italian restaurant were barred from entering by security guards.  They stabbed one guard to death, and then blew themselves up on the street, killing two local guards outside the adjacent Belgian Consulate.

 

The bomber assigned to attack the Jewish cemetery got lost and blew himself up at a fountain 150 yards away, killing three Muslim passersby in addition to himself.  The assailants who blew themselves up outside the Jewish cultural center were on a fool’s errand, since the planners of the operation overlooked the fact that the facility would be closed on a Friday evening, the beginning of the weekly Sabbath for Jews.

 

The organizers of the 2003 blasts had ties to Salafist Jihad (SJ), the leading domestic Islamic militant group.  Very loosely structured and secretive, it was established in the early 1990s by religious extremists and veterans of the war against the Soviet army in Afghanistan to combat drug-dealing, prostitution, gambling, alcohol consumption and police corruption in the slums of Casablanca and other cities.

 

In turn, SJ is interwoven with the GICM, a shadowy terrorist network present in Morocco and the immigrant ghettos of Western Europe.  It mainly was Moroccan immigrants to Spain with links to GICM operatives who were behind the 11 March 2004 bombings aboard commuter trains in Madrid that killed 191 people.

 

The GICM includes hard-core transnational Islamic terrorists.  One of them, Saad Houssaini, a 38-year-old veteran of al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan who purportedly headed the military committee of the group, was arrested in Casablanca on 8 March.  Dubbed “The Chemist” by the Moroccan press, he had been sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison for involvement in the 2003 suicide-bombings.  On 20 March, he was charged with organizing new acts of terrorism. 

 

It is conceivable that Houssaini was in direct or indirect contact with the Raydi cell.  Indeed, the altercation in the Internet cafe occurred just three days after Houssaini’s arrest, and Raydi may have strapped explosives to his body because he feared authorities were on his trail.

 

It would be difficult to overstate the role Moroccans living outside their homeland play in transnational Islamic terrorism.  A Moroccan named Khalid Habib is said to have risen to the heights of the al-Qaida hierarchy in Pakistan.  Moroccans Abdelkarim el-Mejjati and Younis Ibrahim al-Hayyari were important terrorist commanders in Saudi Arabia before they were killed by security forces in separate gunbattles in 2005.

 

Moroccans based in Western Europe figure prominently in networks supporting jihad in Iraq and elsewhere.  To give a recent example, Ahmad Essafri, a Swedish citizen of Moroccan origin with links to the GICM, was arrested in December in northern Morocco on suspicion of being part of a 26-man jihadist recruiting group.  In another recent case, Khaled Oussayeh, a Moroccan-born Belgian citizen linked to the 2003 Casablanca blasts and 2004 Madrid atrocity, was sentenced by a Moroccan security court in January to three years in prison.  He was extradited to Morocco from Syria, where he was arrested for visa problems.  Presumably, he was in Syria to get to Iraq, or help others get to Iraq.

 

Moroccan security officials say about 50 Moroccans are known to have fought in Iraq – a figure that seems low.  In any case, it is beyond dispute that numerous Moroccans have carried out suicide-bombings in Iraq.  Many of those suicide-bombers came from the town of Tetouan in the Rif Mountains, the impoverished northern region that is so close yet so far from Western Europe.  Separately, five residents of Tetouan who were involved in the Madrid train bombings blew themselves up when cornered in an apartment by Spanish police on 3 April 2004.

 

Needless to say, surviving Iraq jihadists pose special risks to Morocco.  Not only do they have combat experience, but significant transnational Islamic terrorist connections.  Also, they loom as heroes to impressionable young men.

 

When it comes to moving cash, materials and operatives, the Moroccan Islamic militant network in Western Europe piggybacks on cross-border rackets run out of North African immigrant ghettos, including narcotics-trafficking, human-smuggling, automobile theft and credit-card fraud.  The countless number of shiftless young men in the immigrant ghettos and back home in Morocco constitute a bottomless recruiting pool for the crime-cum-terror network.

 

Meanwhile, the emergence in Algeria of QIM adds a new dimension to Islamic terrorism in the region.  With its guerrilla struggle against the secular Algerian regime all but lost, the group in recent years has been trying to reinvent itself as the North African branch of al-Qaida.  Moroccan militants with direct links to QIM, which until January called itself the GSPC, increasingly are being arrested.

 

On 6 May, Moroccan security forces broke up a network for recruiting young men to attend QIM camps in Algeria.  Twenty arrests were made in raids in Casablanca and other cities.  Details were not released.

 

In a German court on 16 May, a German citizen of Moroccan origin was charged with providing logistical support to QIM.  The 37-year-old resident of the northern city of Kiel, identified only as Redoune E. H., also was charged with recruitment of jihadists, transfer of money to militants in Syria and Egypt, and the establishment of a terrorist group in Sudan.

 

On 2 March, a court in Sale, near Rabat, convicted roving Tunisian Islamic terrorist Mohammed Msahel and seven Moroccan confederates of organizing a militant cell and preparing terror attacks.  Msahel received a 15-year prison sentence and the seven Moroccans were handed sentences of between two and 10 years.

 

Msahel, a 37-year-old Tunisian who worked as a waiter in the northern Italian city of Milan, reportedly came to Morocco in January 2006 to recruit suicide-bombers.  He and the seven Moroccans were arrested in Sale and Casablanca in late March 2006.

 

Before arriving in Morocco, Msahel visited Algeria, where he met with leaders of the QIM.  Based on statements of Moroccan and Italian authorities, it appears that he was planning attacks against a church in Bologna and public transportation in Milan.  There also reportedly were schemes to hit targets in France, including the Paris headquarters of the Directorate of Territorial Security (French abbr: DST), and targets in Morocco, including the US Embassy.

 

Moroccan authorities until recently asserted that AM, the Islamic militant group broken up by authorities last August, was strictly homegrown.  Above all, what stood out about it was that many of its members were from the elite Anfa district of Casablanca and wealthy areas of other cities – a striking difference from the slum-based militant cells that previously had been cracked.  AM also included several soldiers and policemen, a development that so alarmed officials that conscription was suspended for fear of Islamic militant infiltration of the military.  In addition, the group had received funds through the wives of two pilots employed by the national airline, Royal Air Maroc.

 

The leader of AM reportedly was Hassan Khattab, an Islamic militant who previously had served time in prison.  He reportedly had set up training camps in the environs of Nador and Ouezzane, and planned to fund the group through robberies of banks and armored trucks.

 

Khattab and his deputies were said to be planning attacks against tourist and government targets in the country’s northeast.  Officials have refused to provide details, but the media have said tourist attractions, hotels, the Justice Ministry, and military facilities were on the target list, and that the group also intended to assassinate senior officials and Western diplomats.

 

The Interior Ministry on 31 August said 56 members of AM had been arrested in Casablanca and four other towns, most of them in a series of raids on 7 August.  Their trial has been postponed several times, most recently on 25 May.  On that day, prosecutors introduced four new defendants, one of whom allegedly had links to Islamic militants in Libya and another who allegedly had links to militants in Sudan.  That was the first official suggestion that the group was not entirely homegrown.

 

Unfortunately for corporate personnel, hotels throughout Morocco lack credible physical defenses against potential suicide car-bombings.  The best personnel can do is book rooms facing away from any street or parking lot and as far from the lobby as possible.

 

The Hyatt is the least bad choice in central Casablanca because it has rooms beyond the lobby and gym complex that would be relatively secure in the event of a powerful bombing aimed at the main entrance.  Like the nearby Sheraton and Royal Mansour, the Hyatt has enhanced driveway security somewhat since the March and April suicide-bombings, with incoming vehicles subject to cursory inspection after passing a metal boom that can be lowered and raised.  But close proximity to the street and the lack of delta or concrete barriers means that a determined suicide-driver could get through at any of these establishments.

 

Meanwhile, the Hyatt and nearby hotels recently have enhanced screening of people entering the lobby, with everyone required to pass through a metal detector.  Those arrangements, however, are not water-tight.

 

In central Rabat, the least bad hotel choice is the Le Tour Hassan on rue Chellah, near the royal palace.  The bar area of the hotel looks out on the street, while guest rooms are further back on the other side of the building’s large interior courtyard. 

 

Business travelers might consider sacrificing central locations for sprawling, low-rise hotels further away.  A 20-minute drive from central Casablanca is the Riad Salam, an oceanfront property that is part of the Utell chain.  Although its entrance is near the four-lane road running close to the water’s edge, guests are accommodated in separate buildings set far back from the reception area.  Rooms facing the sea are strongly recommended. 

 

A 20-minute drive from central Rabat is the La Ville Mandarine, in the suburb of Hay Riyad, just off of Avenue Mehdi Ben Berka.  The hotel consists of a set of villas sprawled around a main building in French-Moroccan style.  No car can come within 50 feet of the lobby area, and accommodations are interspersed in large gardens throughout the grounds.

 

Street protests are common in Rabat, Casablanca and other cities, and they sometimes turn violent.  Personnel should give wide berth to all demonstrations and remain indoors in the event of unrest.

 

To play it safe, personnel should avoid discussions of political or religious issues with locals.  At times of heightened anti-Western or anti-Israeli sentiment in the Muslim World, they should monitor developments closely and curtail their circulation.

 

INSIGHTS:  CRIME

 

The vast majority of visitors to Morocco do not fall victim to crime.  Serious petty-theft risks and a minor mugging problem, however, mean that nothing can be taken for granted.

 

Pocket-picking risks are highest aboard and near public transportation as well as in markets and parks and on beaches.  The swirl of people in such places provides perfect cover for the lifting of wallets, mobile phones and other valuables.  There are lone-wolf perpetrators, but for the most part thieves operate in teams, with one member making the grab as a confederate or two create a distraction.  The list of distractions is endless, but classics include the bump, the spilling of food or drink and staged fights and other spectacles.

 

A few thieves are not subtle.  Fleet of foot, they brazenly snare a cell phone, piece of jewelry or other valuable and run away, sometimes handing off the stolen article to an equally fast confederate.  Victims usually are so stunned that they have no time to react effectively.

 

When it comes to snatch-and-run crime, however, motorcycle-mounted perpetrators are the biggest concern.  They zoom up behind victims, catching them off guard, and grab valuables.  In many cases, the grabbing is done by a pillion rider, allowing the driver to concentrate on approach and escape.  Women frequently are targeted because they tend to dangle handbags and shopping bags.  It is not uncommon for thieves on motorcycles to snatch bracelets from wrists and necklaces from necks.

 

It is imperative for victims of motorcycle-mounted thieves to let go of contested objects.  Otherwise, they risk being dragged and seriously injured.  To avoid becoming a target, handbags and backpacks should not be carried on the street and jewelry should not be worn at all.  Instead, personnel should make use of neck pouches and belt packs, wearing them against the front of the body.

 

Generally speaking, commonsense precautions go a long way toward reducing petty-theft risks.  First and foremost, it is essential to remain alert at all times and in all places.  Personnel should undertake pedestrian activity in pairs or groups, sticking to well-beaten paths in affluent areas.  Men should place wallets in front-trouser pockets and women who must carry a handbag instead of a belt pack should choose a small one and clutch it flush to the abdomen.  Anything of value that is not necessary for the task at hand should be left at hotel, residence or office.

 

In Casablanca, one place to avoid entirely is the Medina, or old city, which is a slum with nothing to offer visitors.  Other places to steer clear of entirely include the Corniche, which crawls with drug addicts and prostitutes, and the beaches northwest of the city center at Anfa and Ain Diab.

 

To the extent possible, personnel should move about by vehicle during the day.  After dark, mugging risks can be reduced dramatically by getting around exclusively by car.

 

Western women in Morocco for the first time should brace themselves for sexual harassment.  Crude remarks are the most widespread form of abuse.  But it also is common for local men to follow foreign women on the street.  Aggressive responses are ill-advised, as that can lead to a worse situation.  Rather, inappropriate remarks should be ignored, as difficult as that can be in some cases.  If followed, the best response is to duck into the nearest business establishment, and to call friends or colleagues if the harasser does not go away.

 

Women should wear loose clothing that covers as much flesh as possible.  During the day, they should move about in trusted male company to the extent possible.  At night, a male escort is essential. 

 

Newcomers to Morocco often are taken aback by the aggressive behavior of child beggars.  Not all street kids are thieves, but the sad fact is that many actively look for an opportunity to pluck a wallet or reach into a handbag or backpack.  In the worst cases, groups of them use swarming tactics against unsuspecting foreigners.

 

Personnel should keep as far away as possible from street urchins.  If they get too close, the proper response is to swing one’s arms, or tighten one’s grip on anything one is carrying, and yell “No!” and “Police!” as loudly as possible.

 

Those tempted to give street children money should think twice.  Many young beggars are addicted to glue-sniffing and must give a cut of the money they collect to adult overseers.  From a humanitarian perspective, it is far better to give them sweets or juice.

 

Both petty and strong-arm criminals are known to lurk around ATMs, eyeing potential victims.  Personnel should stick to cash machines inside of banks and luxury hotels, and even then should make sure that no one is watching PIN-punching.

 

Credit-card fraud is common enough that charges only should be made in luxury hotels.  All credit-card receipts should be inspected carefully to make sure charges have not been inflated.

 

It should be noted that Moroccan service workers of all categories expect tips.  They can get aggressive with foreigners who fail to comply with the local custom of extending a gratuity.

 

Hard bargaining with local merchants is part of the Moroccan experience.  Some merchants, however, go too far.  There are regular reports of tourists being intimidated into coughing up sums they do not want to pay.  Also, foreigners who think they are buying fine carpets, jewelry and other items often end up with inferior goods.  A well-known trick played on foreigners who buy carpets is to pull a switch in the shipping process, with top-of-the-line merchandise being replaced by cheaper versions.

 

Meanwhile, it is all too common for local men with no qualifications to pose as tour guides.  Some of them simply want a few dollars for leading the way to a site or two.  Others are full-fledged crooks, determined to extract money from victims by stealth or force.  The ability of shifty locals to use lies or charm to have their way with foreigners should not be underestimated.

 

It is imperative for foreigners to get shopping and tour tips from trusted veterans of the local scene, or through reputable travel agencies or business-class hotels.  Foreigners seeking to purchase carpets or other expensive handicrafts should obtain expert advice.

 

It is common for foreigners to be offered marijuana and hashish, which are produced in abundance in Morocco.  It is important to note that there are many scams in which dealers work with crooked police to entrap foreigners who buy or use drugs.  Also, there are cases of local marijuana and hash being laced with substances that cause smokers to hallucinate or fall ill.  In some cases, shiftless foreign potheads are involved in the scams.

 

Separately, it is not unknown for local and foreign criminals to put soporifics or other substances in the food or drink of unsuspecting foreign visitors.  When victims fall asleep or get sick, they are robbed.

 

The bottom line is that personnel should steer clear of drugs and people who use them.  Also, food and drink should not be accepted from strangers in any environment.  Generally speaking, overly friendly approaches by locals or foreigners should be greeted with suspicion.

 

When it comes to nighttime entertainment, personnel without trusted local contacts should stick to the bars, discos and casinos of major hotels.  Those who must go out should go to nearby restaurants recommended by hotel staff.  Travel should be door-to-door by vehicle.

 

Night or day, the best way to get around is by chauffeur-driven company car.  Those lacking that option should book a car and driver through a business-class hotel, rental-car company or reputable travel agency.

 

Street taxis can be patronized, but many cabbies drive like lunatics.  Also, as is typical in Morocco, many cabbies speak Arabic and French but little or no English.

 

There are two kinds of taxis.  Grands taxis are top-end sedans usually painted a cream color that are engaged for long rides, including to the airport.  Petits taxis are mostly old French subcompacts geared toward short rides; they are painted red in Casablanca and blue in Rabat.

 

In any taxi, the fare should be negotiated up front to avoid gouging by the driver.  Newcomers should have hotel staff or trusted local colleagues summon cabs, relay directions and negotiate rates on their behalf.  Passengers should not hesitate to shout at drivers to slow down or avoid reckless maneuvers.  A howl of protest should greet any attempt to pick up other passengers en route.  Of course, personnel should not enter any taxi if anyone besides the driver is inside.

 

Urban buses should be avoided altogether due to petty-crime risks and mechanical-safety concerns.  Personnel may use trams in affluent districts during daylight hours.

 

Although some foreigners do it, self-driving cannot be recommended.  Accident rates are extremely high on the chronically overcrowded and largely battered road network.  Traffic lights often are broken and signs obscured.  The safest place to be in a car is in the back seat wearing a seat belt.

 

In the event of an accident, vehicles legally cannot be moved until police arrive.  More routinely, police stop cars for real or imagined infractions; they sometimes confiscate the licenses of motorists who refuse to pay fines on the spot.

 

Both drivers and passengers need to guard against thieves who wade into traffic and reach into open windows – or even smash windows – to grab valuables that catch their eye.  Vehicle doors should be locked and windows rolled up at all times.  Attractive items should not be left in view in moving or parked vehicles.  Most urban areas have unofficial parking attendants who, for a small sum, at least go through the motions of keeping watch over vehicles.

 

Carjacking is not unknown.  Typically, perpetrators use their own vehicle to bump another car, which they then steal by stealth or force when the driver gets out to inspect the damage.  Carjacking victims who offer the slightest resistance risk assault and serious injury.

 

Conventional car theft is common enough that some combination of audible alarm and steering wheel and brake locks and fuel and ignition-cutoff switches is essential.  Of course, guarded parking is the best defense of all.

 

Personnel should carry a cell phone for use in emergencies.  In cities, the police can be reached by dialing 190 (officers are likely to speak Arabic as well as French and perhaps Spanish in the north, but not English).  In the countryside, the gendarmeries can be called at 177 (only Arabic and Berber are likely to be spoken).

 

Incoming passengers at any of the country’s major airports should pre-arrange a pickup by company or hotel car.  Another option is to book a rental car with a driver in the arrivals hall.  Taking a registered taxi is feasible, but much more stressful.  Taxi stands are just outside, with flat rates to various destinations posted on panels.  The cost of a ride from Casablanca’s airport to the city center currently is 230 dirhams ($25.39).  Another 20 dirhams should be added as a tip.  Personnel should avoid gypsy drivers at the airport or anywhere else.

 

Passengers landing in Casablanca and needing to go to Rabat, or vice versa, ideally should book a car and driver ahead of time.  Regular taxis can be hired on the spot for the drive between the two cities, but it is imperative to agree on a price in no uncertain terms before getting underway.

 

Strong locks on luggage are not enough to ward off theft of items inside.  Personnel also should have bags security-wrapped in clear plastic.  Anywhere in airports, luggage should be kept in view and in reach at all times.

 

There have been cases of unscrupulous taxi drivers deliberately driving off with a suitcase or two still in the trunk as passengers offload their luggage at airport departure terminals.  To be on the safe side, personnel should remain alert in such situations.

 

Residential burglary is a serious problem.  The majority of perpetrators are relative amateurs who go around looking for unlocked windows and doors.  While on the prowl, they help themselves to anything of value left on patios, balconies or anywhere else outside of residences.  More organized groups attempt to force their way into houses and apartments, usually after conducting surveillance to make sure no one is home.

 

In a ghastly incident, an Italian diplomat attached to the European Commission and his Belgian wife were murdered by a 25-year-old man who broke into their villa in the Hay Riyad area of Rabat on the night of 19 September.  The couple’s four children were home at the time but were not harmed.  The next day the assailant was arrested while driving the diplomatic car assigned to the Italian.  He confessed to carrying out the double-murder while high on drugs.

 

Apartments inherently are more secure than detached residences, although it is important to select units above the ground floor and below the top floor.  Ideally, buildings should have multiple access controls.  Entry doors should be solid-core with high-quality dead-bolt locks and 190-degree optical viewers.  There should be deep-set grilles on accessible windows and skylights.  Protected parking is essential as well.

 

Those security features also are mandatory for houses, in which most foreigners live.  Detached dwellings also require audible alarms and perimeter walls at least six-feet high.  It is strongly recommended that those seeking houses choose dwellings inside gated communities with around-the-clock guard service.  For stand-alone houses, professional guards are essential; they can be hired for about $140 per month through several competent local security companies. 

 

Preferred neighborhoods in Rabat are Souissi and Hay Riyad (despite the double-murder).  In Casablanca, the leading choices include the seaside Anfa district, Cil and Ain Diab to the west, Oasis and Californie to the south and Maarif and Gautier closer to the center.

 

When it comes to inter-city travel, personnel can choose between train and car.  Rail passengers should ride first-class whenever possible, since security and comfort are somewhat better than in second class.  There is a modern highway network between Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, Fez and Marrakesh.  Otherwise, roads in the interior are hazardous two-lane affairs used by vehicles, people and animals of all descriptions.  Car travel in the Rif and Atlas mountains is especially treacherous.  Road trips should be concluded before nightfall without exception; personnel should bring along cell phones and first-aid kits. 

 

Travel to Western Sahara remains restricted; those who receive permission to go should keep in mind that off-road travel cannot be sanctioned due to buried landmines.  The land border with Algeria is closed; in any case, terrorism risks in Algeria mandate that entry be made only by air.

 

INSIGHTS:  POLITICS

 

By all indications, the Islamist-oriented PJD will come out on top in the upcoming parliamentary elections.  That presents a major dilemma for King Mohammed, who has won plaudits in the West as a modernizer.

 

The king could blatantly rig the elections against the PJD, but that would set back the limited democratic reforms he has introduced.  He could allow a completely free vote, but a strong PJD presence in parliament would set back his efforts to introduce women’s rights and other social reforms.

 

At a minimum, Mohammed has decided not to make things easy for the PJD.  Police have harassed the group as it tries to hold rallies and press conferences, raising the specter of a more widespread crackdown.  The king quite possibly is angling for a repeat of the 2002 parliamentary elections, when the PJD fielded candidates in just 20 percent of constituencies and won only 13 percent of the vote.

 

Secular leaders have sought to assure Western governments and foreign investors that PJD influence will be limited, regardless of the outcome of the elections.  First of all, it is highly unlikely that the PJD or any other party will win enough votes to govern alone.  Second, the king is under no obligation to choose a prime minister from the party that wins the most votes.  Also, the king appoints and dismisses governments at will, makes all civil and military appointments, and launches all major political initiatives through his control of numerous agencies and commissions that overshadow the parliament and cabinet.  Finally, Mohammed is the official spiritual leader of the country, holding the title amir al mumineen, or commander of the faithful.

 

The PJD has been tolerated up to now because it recognizes the legitimacy of the monarchy and opposes militant Islam.  Yet there is concern about its commitment to democratic principles.  Indeed, the glue that holds the PJD together is Islamic fundamentalism, not some credible alternative vision of how to run the country on a day-to-day basis.

 

Mohammed probably would like to retain Prime Minister Driss Jettou, a respected technocrat appointed in 2002.  But the party that carries the heaviest weight in the current government, the left-leaning Socialist Union of Popular Forces (French abbr: USFP), is lagging in the polls.  The other principle parties in the current governing coalition, the conservative Istiqlal (Independence) party and the center-left National Independent Rally (French abbr: RNI), are not likely to gain ground in the elections.

 

The other secular political force is the center-right, consisting of the Popular Movement (French abbr: MP), the National Popular Movement (French abbr: MNP), and the Democratic Union (French abbr: UD).  Even together, however, those parties probably would not win as many votes as the PJD, if the electoral playing field were to be level.

 

In fact, Mohammed needs the PJD to participate in mainstream politics to fend off al-Adl wa al-Ihsan (JC - Justice and Charity), a harder-line Islamist movement which is outlawed.  Declaring that the upcoming elections would not be sufficiently free and fair, the JC in May declined to throw its support to the PJD.

 

JC enjoys strong support among the urban poor and university students.  It provides desperately needed social services and has distinguished itself for being far more generous, efficient and honest than state welfare agencies.  It regularly annoys the king by organizing protests against his liberal social policies and alliance with the United States.

 

JC has been under constant scrutiny from the security services, and its leaders have been in and out of jail for years.  But no smoking gun linking the group to terrorism ever has been found.

 

In May 2006, authorities took the unprecedented step of rounding up hundreds of JC members.  Many arrests occurred in Oujda, 330 miles east of Rabat, and in the nearby town of Beni Modhar.  Others were taken into custody in the capital, Casablanca and other major cities.  Most of the suspects were released after questioning.

 

At the time, it appeared that the roundup was motivated by media reports that some of the group’s leaders had called for an Islamic uprising later in 2006.  Most likely, however, the regime simply decided to get tough with the group.

 

Without a doubt, Mohammed is competing with JC and PJD for the hearts and minds of ordinary Moroccans.  His main weapon has been to improve the lives of the poor, but very much remains to be done.  Indeed, about 20 percent of the country’s 30 million people live in poverty, and about 40 percent are illiterate.  The official unemployment rate of 11 percent masks the fact that perhaps one-third of urban youths are jobless.

 

In 2005, the king launched a costly, long-term program to introduce clean water and modern schools to slums.  In recent years, his economic reforms have led to the creation of 120,000 jobs annually.  But half of the population is under 25.  In the next 15 years, a staggering 400,000 jobs need to be created annually to absorb youngsters entering the workforce.

 

Mohammed is an economic liberal.  He has signed free-trade agreements with the US and other countries and sold off stakes in leading state enterprises.  Inflation is under control, and foreign reserves are growing.  GDP growth averaged 4.6 percent per year from 2001 to 2004, before falling to 1.8 percent in 2005 and climbing to 6.7 percent last year.

 

The impatience of ordinary Moroccans is a counterweight to liberalization.  On 24 December, leftist and consumer advocacy groups organized a 6,000-strong protest in Rabat against rising prices for transportation, basic foodstuffs, water and electricity.  A series of protests in Casablanca earlier in 2006 forced Lyonnaise de Eaux de Casablanca (Lydec), controlled by the French utilities company Suez, to cut water and electricity prices for low-income households.  It is clear that for the foreseeable future, the government will not completely lift subsidies on fuel, staple foods and other essentials.     

 

The 43-year-old Mohammed could not be more different than his late father, King Hassan II, who for 38 years ruled the country with an iron fist and little regard for economic and social development.  In a first for the Arab World, Mohammed launched a truth commission to get to the bottom of human-rights abuses under his father.  Officially called the Equality and Reconciliation Commission, the body issued its final report in 2006, naming those it judged perpetrators of abuse and documenting what they had done.  It remains to be seen, however, if Mohammed will follow up on the commission’s recommendations for reparations to victims and institutional and legislative reforms.

 

Indeed, full democracy is not in the cards.  Mohammed has refused to concede that the monarchy shared blame for the human-rights abuses under his father.  More importantly, it is inconceivable that he would give up his power to steer parliament and the government in the direction he desires.

 

Although the press is freer than in most Arab countries, it still operates under restraints.  In a case closely watched by international advocates of media freedom, a court in January imposed three-year suspended prison sentences and a $9,300 fine on two journalists accused of defaming Islam, the monarchy and breaching public morality in jokes they wrote for Nichane, a magazine launched last September that immediately became popular with educated young city-dwellers.  The court also ordered publication of the magazine suspended for two months.  Prosecutors had sought five-year sentences and a permanent ban on the magazine.

 

Finally, Morocco continues to refuse to surrender control of the Western Sahara, which it took over when Spain withdrew in 1975.  Adhering to a newly passed UN Security Council resolution, Rabat on 30 April made a major concession by agreeing for the first time ever to talk to the Polisario Liberation Front, an indigenous guerrilla force that fought Moroccan forces until it basically was defeated two decades ago.  Rabat, however, continues to insist that it will not allow local people to conduct a referendum on independence.

 

After so many years, Rabat has vested interests in the Western Sahara in the form of access to phosphate resources and large numbers of settlers from Morocco proper.  The African Union recognizes the Polisario as the legitimate government of the territory and refuses to accept Morocco as a member, but that has failed to alter the Moroccan position.